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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Craig Allen Hunter appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon 
his conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence (DUI). Specifically, 
Hunter challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The district court made the following findings of fact following a hearing on 
Hunter's motion to suppress: 
The Defendant is charged by Criminal Information with 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (third 
offense), a felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005; 18-8004; 
18-8004C(2). 
On October 5, 2013, at approximately 12:01 a.m., Corporal 
Pelkey observed a white Mercedes pull onto Cleveland Boulevard 
from a parking lot and cross over the immediate right hand lane of 
travel into the left hand lane of travel with its left turn signal 
activated. According to the police officer, the Mercedes never 
established itself in the right hand lane of travel. After establishing 
itself in the left hand lane, the Mercedes travelled approximately 
one hundred fifty (150) feet while signaling a left turn for 
approximately three (3) seconds. The Mercedes then executed a 
left turn onto 26th Avenue and pulled into a vacant parking lot in 
response to Corporal Pelkey's signal to pull over. Corporal Pelkey 
stated in his police report and again at the preliminary hearing that 
he pulled over this vehicle because it failed to utilize a turn signal 
for five (5) seconds, in violation of I.C. § 49-808(2). The officer 
approached the driver and identified him from his Idaho Driver's 
License as Craig Hunter, the Defendant. Officer Pelkey smelled 
the odor of alcohol and observed that the Defendant's eyes were 
bloodshot. The Defendant admitted consuming three drinks and he 
was detained due to suspicion of driving under the influence. 
Hunter subsequently failed three field sobriety tests and was asked 
to submit to a breath test. After four failures to provide a sufficient 
breath sample to measure breath alcohol content, a search warrant 
was obtained to collect a blood sample. The blood sample was 
collected and the Defendant was arrested. 
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(R., p.45.) 
Hunter filed a motion to suppress asserting the initial traffic stop was 
impermissible because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that Hunter had 
committed a traffic violation. (R., pp.32-35.) The court denied Hunter's motion 
finding the initial driving conduct observed by Officer Pelkey, turning from a right-
hand lane into a left-hand lane, was a violation of I.C. § 49-644 and provided the 
officer with legal cause to conduct a traffic stop. (R., p.48.) 
Hunter entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, reserving the right 
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.56-62, 68-70; 3/26/14 Tr., 
p.15, L.18 - p.16, L.6, p.21, Ls.1-24.) The court placed Hunter on a four-year 
period of supervised probation with an underlying sentence of two-years fixed 
followed by three-years indeterminate. (R., pp.79-80; 5/12/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.5-12.) 
Hunter timely appealed. (R., pp.83-85.) 
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ISSUE 
Hunter states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hunter's Motion to 
Suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Hunter failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Hunter Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Hunter challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did 
below that "his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Corporal Pelkey 
detained him without reasonable suspicion." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Below, 
Hunter argued the officer was mistaken about what I.C. § 49-808(2) required of a 
driver when signaling his or her intent to turn and as such had no cause to stop 
Hunter. (R., pp.33-34). Below and on appeal Hunter contends that he "made the 
safest turn possible under the circumstances" and was not required to comply 
with the turning requirement of I.C. § 49-644 because doing so was impracticable 
and would have made it impossible to subsequently comply with the turn signal 
requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2). Hunter's argument fails. (Appellant's brief, 
p.10). 
The trial court found "[r]egardless of whether the officer was interpreting 
§ 49-808(2) correctly at the time of this traffic stop, he had legal cause to stop the 
vehicle because of his observation of the violation of I.C. § 49-644." (R., p.48.) 
The district court correctly interpreted I.C. § 49-644 as requiring a turn "into the 
right, or nearest lane" as Hunter exited a parking lot. (R., pp.47-48.) Because the 
officer observed Hunter as "he drove across the nearest lane and directly into 
the left lane," (R., p.48 (emphasis added)), the officer had a reasonable, 
articulable basis to conduct the traffic stop. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
That The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Hunter Because He 
Violated The Turning Requirements Of I.C. § 49-644(1) 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P .3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 
P.3d at 1210. "An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
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United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Idaho Code § 49-644 governs required position and method of turning on 
Idaho highways and provides, in relevant part: 
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows: 
(1) Both the approach for a right turn and the right turn shall be 
made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway. 
§ 49-644(1 ). The district court found the plain language of this statute required a 
person making a right-hand turn to turn "into the right, or nearest lane." (R., 
pp.47-48.) Corporal Pelkey stopped Hunter after observing him exit a parking lot 
onto Cleveland Blvd. and "cross the right-hand lane to get into the left-hand 
lane." (2/20/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.10-13.) Hunter argues he made the safest turn 
possible by crossing over the right lane in order to get to the left lane in enough 
time to correctly signal his upcoming turn. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (201 0); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the 
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the 
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interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); State 
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a statute 
'"must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003)). "[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." .!.st (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun 
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665,667,851 P.2d 961,963 (1993)). 
The language of the statute in question is unambiguous. When making a 
right-hand turn, the approach and the turn shall be made "as close as practicable 
to the right-hand curb or edge of the driveway." I.C. § 49-644 (1 ). The plain 
language of the statute clearly directs a driver to turn from the extreme right-
hand lane to the extreme right-hand lane when practicable. In Re: Beyer, 155 
Idaho 40, 304 P.3d 1206 (Ct.App. 2013), held the language of § 49-644(1) 
unambiguously requires "that a driver turn into the right, or nearest lane, rather 
than drive across the nearest lane and directly into the left lane of a four-lane 
road consisting of two lanes in each direction." 155 Idaho at 45, 304 P.3d at 
1211. Hunter did not do that. Instead, he "cross[ed] over the immediate right 
hand lane of travel into the left hand lane of travel" and failed to "establish[ ] 
[himself] in the right hand lane of travel." (R., p.45.). 
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Because Hunter turned from the right-hand land into the left-hand lane, 
the district court correctly upheld the traffic stop as being justified by a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Hunter violated I.C. § 49-644(1). Hunter's 
argument that his desire to make a successive left turn made his compliance with 
this statute not "practicable" is without merit. Faced with the choice of taking the 
most direct route to his destination or complying with traffic laws, Hunter made 
the wrong choice. Hunter has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Hunter's motion to suppress and affirm his judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 2ih day of April, 2015--------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2th day of April, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
DATED this 2th day of April, 20 
NLS/pm 
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